Guardian and Ward-De Facto Guardian by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 14 | Issue 4 Article 7
4-1939
Guardian and Ward-De Facto Guardian
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1939) "Guardian and Ward-De Facto Guardian," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 14: Iss. 4, Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol14/iss4/7
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
are concerned the owner should be estopped to deny the grant of the speci-
fied uses. 1 2
Apparently there have been no Indiana decisions on the precise problem
involved in the principal case. It has been indicated, however, that should
the problem arise relief would be given.13  It is hoped that if the case arises
the court will grant relief and base its decision on the ground of estoppel
rather than confuse the issue by relying on implied covenant or public dedica-
tion. E. 0. C.
GUARDIAN AND WARD-DE FACTO GUARDIAN.-While East Chicago State
Bank was legal guardian of a certain minor child, insurance moneys be-
longing to the ward were collected by the guardian and held in trust. Upon
expiration of the charter of East Chicago State Bank, a new bank was
organized. The latter bank took over all assets and assumed all liabilities
of the former including a deposit in the trust department of East Chicago
State Bank as property of the ward. The reorganized bank, although never
judicially appointed guardian, continued to act in fact as guardian of said
ward, subsequently filing an inventory and appraisement of property be-
longing to the ward, in which it designated itself as guardian, and later a
guardian's account current with the Superior Court. The reorganized bank
was taken over by the Department of Financial Institutions of the State of
Indiana and at time of closing had on hand a fund belonging to said ward.
Appellant is legal guardian, and in a liquidation proceeding by the state,
filed a petition based upon Chapter 167 of the Acts of 1931, which gave pre-
ference to any property held in a fiduciary capacity, to have the claim of
guardian allowed as preferred. Lower court disallowed the preference but
allowed a general claim. Held, reversed with instruction that claim be
allowed as preferred. Bank of Whiting, etc. v. The East Chicago State Bank
(Ind. 1938), 17 N. E. (2d) 491.
1 McCleary v. Lourie (1922), 80 N. H. 389, 117 A. 730; Hille v. Nill
(1929), 58 N. D. 536, 226 N. W. 635; David v. Griswald (1913), 23 Cal. App.
189, 137 P. 619; Nave v. City of Clarendon (Tex. Civil App. 1919), 216 S. W.
1110.
IsIn Bennett v. Seibert (1894), 10 Ind. App. 369, 378, 35 N. E. 35, the
Court said, "If one owning lands lays out a town thereon, and makes and
exhibits a map or plan thereof, with spaces marked public squares, parks, etc.,
and sells lots with reference to such map or plan (though unrecorded) the
purchasers of lots in such town acquire, as appurtenant thereto, every easement
privilege which the map or plan represents as a part of the town,....
The actual controversy before the court concerned the apportionment of street
assessments between a purchaser and the city. See also; Rhoades v. Town of
Brightwood (1896), 145 Ind. 21, 43 N. E. 942 (action to quiet title by grantor.
Held, where lots are sold with reference to a plat rights of both public and
purchasers of lots intervene so there is an irrevocable dedication) ; Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ry. Co. (1897), 148 Ind. 101, 47 N. E.
332 (action for damages caused by obstruction of public highway. The Court
says that secret intentions cannot prevail against conduct upon which the
public or those dealing with a person have relied [p. 107] and also recognizes
that landowners have rights distinct from rights in the public [p. 108J.)
1 See discussion in Martin's Admr. v. Fielder (1887), 82 Va. 455, 4
S. E. 602.
RECENT CASE NOTES
The doctrine of constructive guardian has long been a part of the law
of guardian and ward,1 and has been rejected by only two cases. 2  The
situation arises where one assumes to act as a guardian or enters upon an
infant's estate, who has not been regularly appointed a guardian. It may
result from a voluntary assumption of the duties,3 a void appointment by
a court without jurisdiction,4 or acts performed by one who was by himself
and other parties concerned, considered an "accomodation guardian."5 Recogni-
tion of the need for protection of the infant resulted in giving the infant
an election to treat such a person as a wrongdoer or as a guardian.6 In
the latter case a relation similar to that of trustee and cestui que trust is estab-
lished,? and the guardian de son tort may be compelled to account as a
guardian. Being subject to all the duties attaching to a legally constituted
guardian, he will be held accountable for the principal and interest of the
estate,8 and for the care of the ward's person.9 As a general proposition,
he is deprived of the rights of a legal guardian, having no authority to act
so as to bind the estate as a guardian1O or to act so as to bind the person of
the ward as by consenting to its adoption.'1 The one exception is found
where the de facto guardian or one claiming under him has been allowed to
recover for services from the ward or his estate what would be reasonable
had he been acting as guardian of the ward.' 2 The relation of guardian de
2 Bell v. Love (1883), 72 Ga. 125; Burch v. State (1832), 4 Gill & J.
(Md.) 444 which confined the doctrine to Chancery.
3 Kies v. Brown (1936), 222 Iowa 54, 268 N. W. 910. Ward's father
assumed guardian's duties after his death.
4Zeideman v. Molasky (1906), 118 Mo. App. 106, 94- S. W.-754.
5 See In re Cuffe's Estate (1922), 63 Mont. 399, 207 P. 640, stating that such
a guardian cannot and does not exist.
6 Anderson's Admr. v. Smith (1904), 102 Va. 697, 48 S. E. 29; Patrick
v. Woods (1808), 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 223; and see Bibb v. McKinley (Ala. 1839)
9 Port. 636 holding the rule inapplicable to one holding as an executor with-
out his consent.
7 Zeideman v. Molasky (1906), 118 Mo. App. 106, 94 S. W. 754; Neblett
v. Valentino (1936), 127 Tex. 279, 92 S. W. 2d 432. Distinction is that
guardian does not have title to ward's property but has only custody and
management. In Davis v. Harkness (1844), 6 Il1. (1 Gillman) 173, 41 Am.
Dec. 184, it was pointed out that it would be a strange rule of equity which
did not protect the infant as well "against the violence of the wrongdoer
as against the peculations of the appointed guardian."
8 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations, (6th
ed. 1921) 823.
9 Starke v. Storm's Executor (1913), 115 Va. 651, 79 S. E. 1057; In re
Harris' Guardianship (1915), 17 Ariz. 405, 153 P. 422, (Master not de facto
guardian as to infant servant).
10Aldrich v. Willis (1880), 55 Cal. 81; Stephens v. Hewitt (1899), 22
Tex. Civ. App. 303, 54 S. W. 301; Young v. Downey (1899), 150 Mo. 317,
51 S. W. 751. In the latter case, the court stated, "Nor did the fact she was
within a few days thereafter duly appointed and qualified as his guardian
confirm what she had theretofore done without authority".
l1Ex Parte Martin (1916), 29 Idaho 716, 161 P. 573; Smith v. Cameron
(1909), 158 Mich. 174, 122 N. W. 564.
12 In re Gambastiani's Estate (1934), 1 Cal. App. 2d 639, 37 P 2d 142;
Patrick v. Woods (1808), 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 223.
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facto and ward probably ceases upon majority and a mere agency relation
exists, 13 although some courts have held that it continues. 1 4
The two Indiana cases upon which the decision in the principal case is
based15 establish that-an infant may consider any person entering upon his
land and receiving proceeds thereof as his "guardian, bailiff or trustee" and
compel him to account for them in a court of equity. Consistency with deci-
sions of other jurisdictions, with logic and justice necessarily requires that
the same rule apply to personal property of the ward (treated in the same
way.)1 6 Further support is given the decision in the principal case by an-
other Indiana decision which holds that since a ward is incapable of choos-
ing a theory or representative, of waiving a right or doing any act that
would operate as an estoppel, his guardian likewise can do none of these
things for him, to his detriment. The failure of The East Chicago State Bank,
in whose position the receiver now stands, which acted and was recognized
by the court as guardian, can thus not amount to an estoppel to defeat the
present guardian's claim.
The decision appears sound as an application of the de facto guardian
principle, a rule of justice and fairness, to the policy of the controlling statute.1S
W. A. V.
TORTS--DuTY OWED BY RAILROAD TO HABITUAL TRESPASSERs.-In a suit
against the engineer of a train, the railroad company, and its receiver,
appellant sought damages for personal injuries received when, through the
alleged negligent operation of the train, appellant, a boy of twelve, riding
between two cars, lost his balance, and caught his foot in the coupling.
Appellant had climbed on the train during switching operations, when it
stopped on a track which lay within one-hundred feet of a public play-
ground. Evidence was introduced that children long had been accustomed
to leave the playground and ride on trains switching on the nearby tracks
without serious objection from railroad employees, but with their knowledge.
It was shown that those in charge of the train had not seen the boy get on,
and that they could not have seen him after he had taken his position between
the cars. The parties stipulated that appellant was a trespasser. Held:
affirmed for defendants. Assuming that appellees were burdened with con-
structive knowledge of the appellant's presence on the train, appellees owed
13 Martin's Admr. v. Fielder (1887), 82 Va. 455, 4 S. E. 602.
14 Parmentier v. Phillips (1816), 4 N. C. (2 Car. Law Reps.) 294; Chaney
v. Smallwood (1843), 1 Gill (Md.) 367.
15 Grimes et. al. v. Wilson et. ux., (1837), 4 Blackf. 332; Breeding v.
Shinn (1856), 8 Ind. 125.
1 GVan Epps v. Van Deusen (1833), 4 Paige (N. Y.) 64, 25 Am. Dec.
516, (money and profits of services of a slave) ; Chancy v. Smallwood (1843),
1 Gill (Md.) 367, (profits from services of slaves).
17 McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind. App. 275.
18 Note, however, that the statute involved in this case was amended
as part of the Financial Institutions Act of 1933. The present applicable
provision precludes the result of the instant case by providing for the con-
veyance to a new trustee or guardian of property held by the bank in any
fiduciary capacity under the appointment of any court. Burns' Ind. Stat.
(1933), § 18-321.
